and (b) the "condition on the right" rationale' adopted by most courts. Assuming that either factor, or both, is applicable, the forum court will generally reach the same result which would have been reached if the action had been brought in the state where the right was created."
Although the borrowing statutes differ in some respects,' 2 it may be said that their general purpose is to bar, in the forum, those actions which have been barred by the statute of limitations of the state where the cause of action arose. 3 Perhaps the main reason for the existence of borrowing statutes is one of policy: a plaintiff against whom the statute of limitations of the locus has already run should not be allowed to follow his defendant to jurisdictions where the prescriptive period has not yet lapsed. 4 In the situation where the action is brought before the statute of limitations of the forum has run, but after that of the locus has, the increasingly popular "condition on the right" rationale 5 compels a court to accept the foreign limitations period if that limitation goes to the "right," rather than to the "remedy." '" It has been held that a time limitation is a "condition on the right" (i) if it is prescribed by the same statute which creates the right," particularly if that right was un- "This is true at least in situations where the statute of the locus provides a shorter prescriptive period than does that of the forum. Thus, if the limitation of the locus is considered a "condition on the right" to which it refers or is made applicable by the borrowing statute of the forum, then the action is governed solely by the lex loci. However, borrowing statutes do not apply where the lex loci prescribes a longer period than does the lex fori. See Notes, 75 A.L.R. z03, z3 (1931), i49 A.L.R. I224, 1237 0944). Contra: John Shillito Co. v. Richardson, ioz Ky. 51, 42 S.W. 847 (x897).
And the "condition on the right" rationale has been applied to the latter situation in only a few cases. See GOODRICH, CONFLICT OF LAWS § 86 (3d ed. 1949 ute barred the action, holding that it had been tolled by operation of another North Carolina statute, which provided that the statute of limitations would not run while a defendant was absent from the state. 2 Admitting that this tolling statute was enacted primarily for the benefit of plaintiffs who were citizens and residents of North Carolina, the court nevertheless extended its protection to nonresident plaintiffs. 29 Thus, the fact alone that the defendant had once been a resident of North Carolina was held to support the invocation of that state's tolling statute in favor of a nonresident plaintiff, even though the cause of action arose in another jurisdiction." It seems certain from the majority opinion in the Appleyard case that the court's willingness to entertain the suit was prompted by the fact that the law of the locus, Texas, had not yet barred the action. 1 Because of the strictures of the procedural-substantive rule, the court could not unequivocally apply the statute of limitations of the locus; rather, it was compelled to adopt a quite unconvincing subterfuge. 3 2 That this opinion may lead to some embarrassment in the future is readily demonstrated by a hypothetical situation. Imagine a case in which the facts are identical with those of the Appleyard case, except that the Texas statute of limitations has also run by the time plaintiff brings his suit in North Carolina. Since the cause of action is barred by the lex loci, and since North Carolina's own prescriptive period has expired, it seems doubtful that the North Carolina court would feel as willing to entertain the suit as it was in the Appleyard case. Yet, since the " Although the opinion does not rest upon this ground, the court, after admitting that the tolling statute was enacted primarily for the benefit of citizens and residents, says, by way of dicta, ". . . this does not mean that our court should not be open to a nonresident plaintiff to enforce a claim on a cause of action that is not barred in the jurisdiction where such cause of action arose, where the debtor has not been a resident of this State for the statutory time necessary to bar the action" (Emphasis added.) 238 N.C. 145, 148, 77 S.E.2d 783, 786 (1953).
'2 Since the court felt bound by the rule that the limitation of the action was go,-erned by the lex for, it was forced to distort the tolling statute in order to reach the desired result. A characterization of the Texas statute of limitations as substantive would have avoided this trip around Robinhood's barn.
rule has been established that the North Carolina statute of limitations is tolled in such a case, the plaintiff would still have a remedy in North Carolina. 3 3 Indeed, if the North Carolina court is faithful to the doctrine of stare decisis, it would have to entertain such an action even if the claim arose twenty or twenty-five years before the suit is brought.
a4
This ludicrous result would follow only from characterization of statutes of limitations as procedural, and hence governed by the lox fori. If, on the other hand, statutes of limitations were characterized as substantive, the limitation period of the locus would automatically be adopted, and any actions arising under its laws would be barred after that period had expired, regardless of where the action might be brought. Mr. Justice Barnhill, perhaps foreseeing the potential danger of the majority's rationale in Appleyard, concurred 8 in the result on the ground that the court should entertain any claim not barred by the statute of limitations of the state in which it arose. 80 He expressly denied, however, that the tolling statute applied to actions on foreign claims arising out of transactions between nonresidents. 7 The present rules, based though they are upon a long line of respectable precedent, 3 have nevertheless been the subject of severe crit-"' Since North Carolina has no borrowing statute, the court would be compelled to follow its own rationale in the Appleyard case and thus allow the action despite the fact that the cause of action would no longer exist under the lex loci.
"' But query whether the court would follow Appleyard to such an extreme in view of the emphasis it seems to place on the fact that the action was not barred by the lex loci. See note 31 supra.
238 N.C. 145, 152, 77 S.E.zd 783, 789 (953) (concurring opinion). "Our statute, when correctly construed, is not controlling. Instead, we must look to the prescriptive statute of the State in which the parties resided at the time the contract was made and the cause of action accrued to determine whether plaintiff's claim is barred. That was the statute in the contemplation of the parties when the contract was made." Id. at 155 , 77 S.E.zd at 792. Justice Barnhill also disagreed with the majority as to the interpretation of the word "return" in the tolling statute (note z8 supra). The majority construed the statute as operating against a defendant who had never been a resident of North Carolina, while Mr. Justice Barnhill felt that the word "return" implied that the statute applied only to a defendant who had been a resident and had left.
"' Mr. Justice Barnhill based his concurrence mainly on the rationale that the note sued upon was "property" governed by the law of Texas, and that since that law would allow the action North Carolina should also allow it. 238 N.C. 145, 153, 77
S.E.zd 783, 790 (1953).
"Property" is used in its generic sense-including not only the note itself, but also the cause of action. See Williams v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 153 N.C. 36o, 69 S.E. 40z (igio). Mr. Jnstice Barnhill's approach suggests a leaning toward the characterization of statutes of limitations as substantive, but he too seems reluctant to defy the weighty authority to the contrary.
38See U. S. 64 (1938) . It was held in this case that the federal courts must adopt the substantive law of the place where the cause of action arose. In Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Co., 313 U.S. 487 (i94x), the United States Supreme Court extended this rationale to state conflict of laws rules. Thus, it has been held that the conflict of laws rules of a federal court sitting in Delaware ". . . must conform to those prevailing in Delaware's state courts. . . . Delaware is free to determine whether a given matter is to be governed by the law of the forum or some other law. . . 738 (1940) . See also Campbell v. Haverhill, 155 U.S. 6,o (1895) (a federal court must apply the statute of limitations of the state in which it sits, in the absence of an applicable federal statute, even though the cause of action arose under the federal law).
"'In a suit brought on the equity side of a federal district court, that court is required to apply the state statute of limitations that would govern like suits in the courts of the state where the federal court is sitting. Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99 (,94s) ; cf. Ragan v. Merchants Transfer Co., 337 U.S. 530 (194-9) (federal court bound by tolling provision of the state in which it sits). "See, e.g., Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, io9 (1945) : "The question is whether such a statute [of limitations] concerns merely the manner and the means by which a right to recover, as recognized by the State, is enforced, . . . or whether such statutory limitation is a matter of substance . . . does it significantly affect the result of a litigation for a federal court to disregard a law of a State that would be controlling in an action upon the same claim by the same parties in a State court?"
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[ Vol. 4: 71 of the locus bars the action, the forum should surely allow the action. Otherwise, the plaintiff would be deprived at least of a piece of his right." Nor should a court be heard to say that it will apply its own statute of limitations because it wishes to avoid litigation of "stale" claims, or because it does not want to crowd its dockets with foreign actions. 4 9 Since the occurrence or transaction from which the cause of action arises is governed by the law of a foreign jurisdiction to which the parties have subjected themselves, neither can complain if the life span of the cause of action is governed by that law. 50 Further, the rationalization that the plaintiff is free to sue upon his right in the state where it was created 5 ' overlooks the fact that the courts there may not have jurisdiction over the defendant.
52
Where the plaintiff brings his action before the statute of limitations of the forum has run, but after that of the locus has, the courts should also apply the statute of the locus. ' It is true that the borrowing statutes and the "condition on the right" rationale virtually effect this desired result in a large percentage of cases; 5 4 but in jurisdictions where these factors are not operative, the courts may still apply the statute "' Furthermore, the very raison d'eire of our courts is that justice is done, and a crowded docket is a poor excuse for abdication of that responsibility. But Story's view still clings to American law: "Every nation must have a right to settle for itself the times and modes and circumstances within and under which suits shall be litigated in its own courts. There can be no pretense to say that foreigners are entitled to crowd the tribunals of any nation with suits of their own which are stale and antiquated to the exclusion of the common administration of justice between its own subjects." STORY, op. cit. supra 
1954]

THE FULL FAITH AND CREDIT CLAUSE 79
of the forum and thus re-create a right which in reality was rendered non-existent by the limitation period of the locus." II Independent of substantive policy considerations involved, there is the further question as to whether the full faith and credit clause of the Constitution 0 requires that the forum adopt the limitations imposed upon a right of action by the state in which it was created. The question was answered in the negative in the leading case of McElmoyle v. Cohen.'t There an action was brought in Georgia to enforce a South Carolina judgment after Georgia's statute of limitations on the action had run. The United States Supreme Court, regarding the defense of limitations as being only a "plea to the remedy," 58 concluded that the full faith and credit clause did not apply to procedural matters. Furthermore, said the Court, a state is not required by the full faith and credit clause to apply in its own courts foreign law 59 which is against the policy of the forum. 0 Thus, it has subsequently been held that a foreign statute of limitations which keeps alive an action which is barred by the statute of the forum need not be adopted, as it conflicts with the latter's policy against stale claims."'
The . . . And the said records and judicial proceedings . . . shall have such faith and credit given to them in every court within the United States as they have by law or usage in the courts of the state from whence the said records are or shall be taken."
'o "Prescription is a thing of policy, growing out of the experience of its necessity . . . the effect intended to be given under our Constitution to judgments is that they are conclusive only as regards the merits. . . 19oz) (reasonable time must be allowed for enforcing a foreign judgment).
02 331 U.S. 586 (-947).
